Introduction
For most of the years since World War II the international system had been characterized by ideological rivalry, bipolarity, and a peace among major powers supposedly imposed by the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons. With the events of 1991 the ideological rivalry officially ended, bipolarity was weakened (if not replaced), and efforts were extended toward a less nuclear future. Analysts have offered contradictory explanations of these changes, as well as a range of expectations about the future. Some suggest that the current course of international relations is strongly conducive to peace and tranquillity, while others claim that an increasing frequency and severity of war is to be expected. These two viewpoints may be labelled 'optimists' and 'pessimists'.' Neither is more than half-right; rather, the end of the Cold War has created reasons for celebration as well as concern. As the title of this article suggests, it is incorrect to suggest, as Fukuyama (1989) does, that history is at an end. The end of the Cold War likely does not represent the peaceful acceptance of a capitalist-liberal international order. Nor is it impossible for new challenges to the international order to emerge. Similarly, it is also incorrect to suggest that we have entered into a period similar to that of Europe between the World Wars (Mearsheimer, 1990) , or that we face a situation unprecedented in international relations (Singer & Wildavsky, 1993) .
In this article I offer reasons for this 'mixed' view of current international reality, suggesting that we should apply established theories of international relations in order to provide a context that will allow us to understand why the momentous changes have occurred, as well as what they mean. The theory used here to provide an interpretation of the current international situation is power transition theory (Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Kugler & Organski, 1989; Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980) . I compare the arguments and explanations offered by power transition theory with those offered by the optimists and pessimists, focusing specifically on the 'Long Peace' that has characterized postwar Great Power international relations, the Cold War's peaceful end, and the emerging post-Cold War world. I close with expectations of what the future might hold.
Power Transition Theory
Power transition theory focuses on the strongest states, and draws implications from their interactions for war, and for the maintenance of and changes to the structure of the international system. It is similar to other 'systemic' theories of international relations, such as long cycle or balance of power theory (Modelski & Thompson, 1989; Niou et al., 1989) . However, unlike most other systemic theories it is not a purely realist theory, because it is not exclusively concerned with power (although power considerations do play a prominent role in it). In addition to power, power transition theory considers each country's satisfaction with the workings of the international system, or status quo. The status quo is a useful abbreviation for the general pattern of diplomatic, economic, and military interactions of members of the international system.
In introducing power transition theory, Organski (1958, The dominant country establishes an international order with rules that direct political, economic, diplomatic and military interactions. The dominant country establishes this order because it derives benefits in the form of wealth, security, and prestige from doing so. Later, Organski & Kugler (1980, p. 23) write that states fight when they do not 'like the way benefits are divided . . .' Recently, Kugler & Organski (1989, p. 173) summarized power transition theory and described the status quo as rules that determine 'the way goods are distributed in the international order'. The status quo codifies how the dominant country would like the other states in the world to behave. The rules it creates toward this end provide it (and some other states) with benefits, and are thus defended.
A description of the international status quo since World War II would focus on the United Nations and its democratic underpinnings,2 the market-economy orientation of international financial institutions, and the generally defensive objectives of international military organizations such as NATO. As a democratic, market-oriented country, the United States (as the dominant state) established these patterns of interaction in accord with its preferences.
Additionally, power transition theory holds that the internal growth of a country determines its power. Since growth rates differ across countries, relative power is constantly changing. Occasionally one country grows so much that it achieves power parity (rough equality) with the international system's dominant state. If the newly rising country (also known as the challenger) is dissatisfied with the international status quo, it will demand changes which will likely be resisted by the dominant state. The combination of power parity between challenger and dominant state combined with the challenger's negative evaluation of the status quo provides the necessary condition for war (according to power transition theory). This war is fought for control of the 'rules of the game', or status quo, of the international system, with the expectation that victory by the challenger will be followed by a restructuring of international diplomatic, economic, and military relations. However, so long as the dominant country is preponderant the Great Power system is at peace. Only when a dissatisfied challenger rises to parity is war among the most powerful countries anticipated by power transition theory.
Because the theory suggests that parity and the challenger's dissatisfaction are jointly necessary for war, a weak dissatisfied challenger is not to be feared. Similarly, a rising country satisfied with the status quo is not expected to start a war even if parity with the dominant country is achieved, because in such instances there is no marginal gain to be achieved through fighting. Satisfied states are pacific states to whom the rules of realist power politics do not apply. Since international structures such as the distribution of power have different impacts on dyads of satisfied states than on dyads that contain both satisfied and dissatisfied states, the status quo clearly differentiates power transition theory from realism or neorealism.3
If one were to understand the present and predict the future based on extrapolations of a preexisting theory, one should select a theory that accounts well for the events of the past. Power transition theory enjoys a distinguished empirical record. First of all, Organski & Kugler (1980) provide strong evidence that wars between contender great powers are fought when parity prevails between them. This finding has been extended to all great powers by Houweling & Siccama (1988) , and by Kim (1989) . Additionally, a general relationship between dyadic parity and war, or between dyadic preponderance and peace, has been reported by a wide range of scholars (Bremer, 1992 (Kim, 1992) , as well as to minor power wars in South America (Lemke, 1993) . In short, there is impressive empirical evidence to support power transition theory's claims that parity and challenger dissatisfaction are strong correlates of war.5
The Long Peace
It is likely that we will be better able to understand the current international order if we understand the situation from which it arose. The post-Cold War world is the successor to the Cold War; and, hopefully a continuation of the 'Long Peace' (Gaddis, 1986 Haas (1970) considers polarity across three sub-systems at various time periods, and finds that whereas bipolarity is generally more stable than multipolarity, although multipolarity is associated with fewer but longer wars. He suggests that unipolarity is the most pacific type of system. Hopf(1991) argues that consideration of 16th-century instances of bi-and multipolarity in European history makes it difficult to suggest one is more stable and peaceful than the other. In more recent work, Kegley & Raymond (1994) differentiate between types of multipolarity, drawing on detailed consideration of six modem time periods. They argue that some types of multipolarity are more dangerous than others.7 The logical and empirical evidence regarding polarity and war suggests we should be cautious in accepting any argument that bipolarity is a significant cause of the Long Peace.
Have nuclear weapons contributed to the Long Peace? There has only been one time period in history in which two or more countries had nuclear weapons they could deliver to each other's territory, and this period overlaps with the absence of Great Power war. As a result, it is impossible to test propositions about whether nuclear weapons have prevented war during the Long Peace, since there is no variation in either the presence of nuclear weapons or the occurrence of war during this period. What we can do, however, is analyze the logical bases and subsidiary propositions of those who argue that nuclear deterrence promotes peace. First, the logical bases. The core argument of the nuclear deterrence school is that the extreme costs nuclear weapons can inflict make countries avoid going to war. Thus, we should logically expect a negative relationship between expected costs and the propensity of countries to engage in war if nuclear deterrence arguments are correct. If this proposition is true, then we should observe some evidence of continually declining propensity for war through history as advances in technology created first the flaked-point projectile, the atalatl, the bow and arrow, rudimentary firearms, machine guns, war-planes, and so on, thereby raising the costs of war. Whereas it is true that the frequency of Great Power war has declined over time (Levy, 1983 , Ch. 6), the evidence of the first half of this century should make us pause before blindly accepting the proposition that high expected costs deter war.
Related to this concern about costs are the questions of extended deterrence and of crises pitting nuclear against non-nuclear countries. If nuclear weapons make countries cautious, then we should expect a notable role for nuclear weapons in the peaceful resolution of extended deterrence situations8 Similarly, in situations where a nuclear state finds itself in a conflict with a non-nuclear state, we should expect the non-nuclear state to be more likely to concede whatever is at dispute, because the potential costs for it are higher than those facing the nuclear state. Contrary to these expectations, Huth & Russett ( Thus, if the two principal elements are suspect to such re-interpretation, and if the explanation for the Long Peace is not relevant to analysis of any other eras of Great Power peace, perhaps we should reconsider the argument altogether. If we question this explanation we might do well to consider an altemrnative explanation; that of power transition theory. Recall that power transition theory argues that Great Power war is anticipated when there is power parity between the dominant country and a dissatisfied challenger. Great Power war cannot occur, according to this theory, unless these two conditions are jointly present. Throughout the Cold War the United States was the dominant country, and the Soviet Union was the (potentially) dissatisfied challenger.'0 However, the Soviet Union never achieved parity with the United States, and therefore war was not expected. As Figure 1 shows, the Soviet Union rarely achieved a GDP of even half that of the United States. The power transition explanation of why the Cold War was part of a Long Peace is that power parity between the US and USSR was never observed. To the skeptical reader this may appear to be an unexceptional explanation of the absence of war, but, as Most & Starr (1982) write, any good theory of the causes of war must simultaneously be a theory of the causes of peace. Power transition theory is both. It accounts well for the instances of Great Power war and peace, at least from the 17th century to the 20th, and this gives us confidence that the explanation of peace since World War II is well founded as well. Alternative explanations of the Long Peace do not possess this historical grounding; their explanations cannot extend backward in time as power transition theory can. Consequently, power transition's explanation of the Long Peace is likely to prove superior to the alternatives discussed above. Arguments such as Gaddis's may provide the best explanation of a single case, but if one is interested in explaining international relations in general such specific explanations prove unsatisfactory. If the emergence of nuclear weapons and bipolarity changed international relations qualitatively, then a theory that does not take this sea-change into account will be a poor basis for extrapolation into the future. I argue above that there are strong reasons for doubting that nuclear weapons or bipolarity have had this effct independently, no explanation has been offered for how the joint occurrence has changed international relations in some fashion different from the independent effects, and thus it is up to those who would argue that the present or recent past does not resemble the past or distant past to explain why this is so. Absent evidence of and an explanation for sea-change, those who would argue that such a sea-change has occurred offer nothing more than opinion, a poor basis for foreign policy."1
The End of the Cold War
The Cold War ended because the Soviet system became so untenable that the USSR could no longer compete with the USA. Failing at competition, the USSR, and now Russia, has turned toward conciliation. This is evidenced by democratization, privatization, decreasing military confrontation, and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. The Cold War ended in parts. The first part involved Soviet internal decay (both economic and political).'2 The second saw the dis-appearance of Cold War competition, tensions and antagonisms.
Did anyone predict that this would happen? There seems to be pretty widespread agreement within the scholarly literature that the answer is no. As far as predicting internal decay, the only explicit prediction I am aware of is that of George F. Kennan, who wrote in 1947:
. . . the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced ( The argument is that since relations within a dyad composed of democracies are more peaceful than those in dyads including at least one non-democracy, should the Soviet Union become more democratic (as it did in an effort to deal with its internal decay), the tensions between the superpowers would ease considerably, thereby ending the Cold War. This sort of contingent statement of probable events is evidence of the ability of some theories to predict the future.
Did power transition theory predict the end of the Cold War? The immediate answer is no. No writing on power transition theory made any contingent statements about the Cold War's end. However, it is possible to interpret Soviet internal decay as consistent with the underlying force driving power transition theory: internal growth. Organski originally wrote of three stages in each country's growth path: an initial stage of potential power marked by slow or no growth, a stage of transitional growth in power during which rapid, fast-paced growth occurs, and finally a stage of power maturation in which the now much more powerful country tapers off and returns to slow growth reminiscent of the first stage (Organski, 1958, Ch. 12; for an elaboration, see Organski, 1965 ). This trend can be visualized as an S-shaped curve in which the rise during the second stage provides the growth that propels one country past another in terms of power. It is this middle stage that leads to the transition from preponderance to parity, from which power transition theory draws its name.
It is fair to say that power transition theory suggests that if a country does not reach parity with another during its stage of transitional growth in power, any subsequent power transition is unlikely. The Soviets did not overtake the United States during their stage of transitional growth in power. As the Soviets realized they would not, in fact, 'bury the West' they attempted reforms conciliatory with the international status quo, and as a result the Cold War ended. Having failed at competition with the dominant country, the USSR turned toward conciliation. This is the power transition theory interpretation of the end of the Cold War. There is no prediction of Soviet internal economic and political decay here, but the consequences of that decay are consistent with the theory. Power transition theory argues that unless the USSR catches up there will not be a war. The USSR did not catch up, and no war occurred. What counts about the zones of peace is that they are something new in the world. Without a government over them they will be peaceful and democratic. They will be a daily reminder to the world that the old message of history, that war is a natural and inevitable part of life, no longer has to be true. The zones of peace will be a demonstration that peace is possible among countries Modem developed democracies have existed in increasing numbers over the past century, but what is different now is that the main threat to these countries, the Soviet Union, has disappeared.'7 The advanced developed democracies are now able to rest content in their preponderance, secure in their stable and prosperous peace. The extraordinarily optimistic expectation about the future is that ultimately all states will inevitably develop, liberalize, and join the zones of peace. According to Singer & Wildavsky, this is joyous news. The days of war are numbered. The future will not resemble the past.
The Pessimists
Perhaps the most familiar pessimistic argument is that of Mearsheimer (1990) , who cautions us that the end of the Cold War -and the subsequent end of bipolarity -means the return of multipolarity in Europe. Mearsheimer makes explicit use of neorealist/balance of power theory in order to argue that this reversion from bi-to multipolarity will likely have disastrous consequences for Great Power peace. He compares the future of the Great Powers with that experienced in Europe in the 20th century prior to the Cold War. He criticizes optimistic counter-arguments that the future will be peaceful due to the high costs of modern war, the existence of so many democracies, or due to some learning process, and persuasively argues that flaws in these alternative theories undercut our ability to accept the scenarios they advance. He concludes that the USA must carefully 'manage' the dangerous multipolarity that the end of the Cold War will bring. Huntington (1989) expresses similar cautions about accepting the optimists' views of the future. He also is critical of expectations based on the democratic peace proposition, cautioning us that the democratic peace proposal: 'is valid as far as it goes, but it may not go all that far' (1989, p. 7). When discussing Mueller's learning process argument, he asks us to consider if perhaps murder, rather than slavery, is not a better comparison to war. Since murder is anything but obsolete, he cautions us against expecting that war will become obsolete too. Huntington to mind. Similarly, a dissatisfied Japan might rise to a position from which it could initiate a war in an attempt to change the status quo. This assumes Japanese growth or US decline that is perhaps not reasonably expected, and also assumes that Japan's current evaluation of the status quo will change. In the long term other actors, perhaps India, might rise in power and desire changes that might necessitate war.
One might be tempted to argue that all of these scenarios are hopelessly unrealistic due to the presence of nuclear weapons. Surely any dissatisfied challenger contemplating world war with the United States must realize that such a conflict involves a (perhaps unacceptably) high probability of nuclear escalation and that this potential eliminates the gains that might be achieved by fighting. Admittedly, this argument has a certain intuitive appeal. It also is appealing because it suggests there will never again be a world war. However, such deterrence arguments are based on the assumption that high costs deter conflict. This assumption is not supported by empirical evidence (Huth & Russett, 1984; Kugler, 1984) . Thus, although the power transition theory expectation of war should China remain dissatisfied and achieve power parity with the United States appears somewhat mechanistic and perhaps unrealistic, it is more consistent than deterrence arguments with the empirical evidence we have thus far. This chilling logic suggests that faith in a nuclear peace may be unfounded.
The optimists and pessimists are, based on this analysis, each half right about what to expect in the future. According to the extrapolation of power transition theory we can expect the Long Peace to continue.22 However, it is conceivable that the current period of peace will come to a very violent end. Should this occur the expectations of the pessimists will be tragically borne out.
The We should be cautiously optimistic about the future. The end of the Cold War means the evaporation of the major challenge to the current initial status quo. Russian efforts at liberalization, democratization and privatization suggest that Russia has moved toward being a member of the satisfied coalition of states. The size of the satisfied coalition means that Great Power war is not to be anticipated anytime soon. However, there are threats to this optimistic scenario. These include Chinese growth unaccompanied by a change in attitude toward the status quo,24 as well as the possibility of dramatic changes in powerful satisfied countries that could lead to a change in their evaluations of the status quo. In this regard the true threat of hyper-nationalist chauvinism such as that of Vladimir Zhirinovsky becomes apparent.25 To ensure against these threats taking material form, the United States and other leading satisfied Great Powers should continue patient cooperation with the Chinese leadership in an effort to encourage democratization and liberalization. The leading satisfied states should also assist the Russians, financially as well as rhetorically, in achieving stability and growth under a democratic market-oriented framework.
In terms of Great Power conflict the world is a safer place now than it has been since the Cold War began. But, in order to prolong this period of safety the powerful satisfied countries will have to remain vigilant and fully engaged in international relations, paying attention to the contingencies that could negate power transition theory's prediction of continued Great Power peace. Transitions to parity between dissatisfied local challengers and local dominant powers are still potential sources of conflict in various minor power regions of the world, as a recent extension of power transition theory suggests (see Lemke, 1993) . Also, note that nothing is said in this prediction about peace between great powers and minor powers. There is nothing in the great power peace prediction of power transition theory to preclude the possibility of war between Russia and one of the newly independent constituent republics of the former Soviet Union. 
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